This paper presents a new axiomatic decision theory for choice under uncertainty. Unlike Bayesian decision theory where uncertainty is represented by a probability function, in our theory, uncertainty is given in the form of a likelihood function extracted from statistical evidence. The likelihood principle in statistics stipulates that likelihood functions encode all relevant information obtainable from experimental data. In particular, we do not assume any knowledge of prior probabilities. Consequently, a Bayesian conversion of likelihoods to posterior probabilities is not possible in our setting. We make an assumption that defines the likelihood of a set of hypotheses as the maximum likelihood over the elements of the set. We justify an axiomatic system similar to that used by von Neumann and Morgenstern for choice under risk. Our main result is a representation theorem using the new concept of binary utility. We also discuss how ambiguity attitudes are handled. Applied to the statistical inference problem, our theory suggests a novel solution. The results in this paper could be useful for probabilistic model selection.
Introduction
Various formal decision theories for choice under risk and uncertainty have been studied since the seminal work by von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) [37] where the expected utility maximization principle was formally established. With few exceptions, a common feature in these theories is the use of probability to express uncertainty in decision situations. As the value of an axiomatic model is based on the acceptability of its assumptions, the debate on the value of the vNM theory started almost immediately with their publication [2] . As the result of this ongoing debate, axiomatic systems that are weaker than vNM but still possess the expected utility representation have been investigated [16, 32, 31] . There is also a recognition that the uncertainty that one usually associates with the words "ambiguity", "vagueness" and "fuzziness" are not the same kind as that associated with "risk." The latter is captured by standard numerical probability.
In this paper 1 , we consider a class of choice problems where uncertainty is characterized by likelihood functions. This class includes a typical statistical inference problem that is formulated as follows. Suppose we are to analyze a statistical experiment on a random variable Y given (i) Y follows one of the distributions in F = {P θ |θ ∈ Ω} parameterized by θ; and (ii) the outcome of the experiment is Y = y. The question is: what can we conclude about the true value of parameter θ?
There is consensus among statisticians about what information sample y brings to the unknown parameter. According to the likelihood principle, one of the fundamental principles of statistics [8, 5, 4] , all relevant information of the sample is encoded in the likelihood function on the parameter space. And the consensus also ends at this point. The statistical inference problem is treated differently by different approaches [3] .
According to the decision-theoretic approach advocated by Wald [38] , the inference problem is viewed as a choice problem. For example, in the context of a hypothesis testing problem, the choice is to either accept or reject a hypothesis. Within the decision-theoretic approach there are several variations. Wald's maximin decision rule selects an action that delivers the most favorable worst-case outcome. A Bayesian treatment of the problem suggests a calculation of posterior probability function on Ω via Bayes's theorem from the likelihood function by assuming a prior distribution. Given the posteriors, actions are compared on the basis of their expected utility.
In this paper, we proposes a third alternative. We construct a decision theory that works directly with likelihood information. We choose to treat likelihood as uncertainty in its own right for a simple reason: priors are not known in many situations.
The problem of probabilistic model selection in the areas of AI, machine learning, pattern recognition and data mining is an example of the statistical inference problem. Given a (training) data set y, researchers construct a probabilistic model P (e.g., a Bayesian net) that generates/fits the data and then use this model for inference with future observations. Because there are, almost always, more than one models that emerge as plausible candidates, model selection is an essential part of model construction.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss extending likelihood functions to an uncertainty measure-a function on the set of subsets of possible worlds. In the main part (section 3), we develop a decision theory for likelihood uncertainty. We begin by proposing a set of five axioms. They are justified by intuition as well as by stochastic dominance principle. Next, we introduce the concept of binary utility and prove the expected utility theorem for likelihood lotteries. That is followed by comments on related works. In section 4, we apply our decision theory for a problem of statistical inference. Finally, section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
Likelihood as Uncertainty Measure
Let us consider the statistical inference problem as described earlier. Although the phenomenon under study is described probabilistically (by a set of probability functions F), the uncertainty pertaining to the choice problem is not. It is a likelihood function. The term 'likelihood' used in modern statistics was coined by R. A. Fisher who mentioned it as early as 1922 [17] . Fisher used likelihoods to measure "mental confidence" in competing scientific hypotheses as a result of a statistical experiment (see [13] for a detailed account). Likelihood has a puzzling nature. For each θ ∈ Ω, there is a likelihood quantity that by magnitude equals P θ (y) -the probability (or probability density in case of infinite Ω) 2 of observing y if θ is in fact the true value of the parameter. However, if we view the set of likelihood quan-tities as a function on the parameter space, we have a likelihood function. A likelihood function is not a probability function. For a simple reason, the sum of all likelihood values (over the parameter space) may not add to unity. Moreover, likelihood functions are equivalent up to a proportional constant.
To emphasize the fact that a likelihood function is tied to data y and has θ as the variable, the notation lik y (θ) is used instead of P θ (y). Technically, probability and likelihood are two kinds of animals, but they are as close as mule and donkey. This proximity is the reason for an intertwining relationship. Obviously, (posterior) probability is derived from likelihood and priors via Bayes theorem. Since such priors are supposed to summarize the information about the parameter before the experiment is conducted, the assumption of its existence is beyond the realm of science as many statisticians contend. Although in certain situations prior probability comes naturally, there is no compelling argument why it must always be known to an experimenter in all situations.
Another path from likelihood to probability, that bypasses the issue of priors, was started by Fisher himself. He suggested to compute what he called fiducial probabilities by normalizing the likelihoods (dividing by the sum of likelihoods). Fisher's idea has been shown to work for isolated examples and but it faces a serious difficulty when applied to general cases. Some statisticians now believe that the fiducial probability is a mistake [3] .
Belief function theory was proposed by Dempster [9] in an attempt to overcome the difficulty of the fiducial argument. Shafer [34] is mainly responsible for turning Dempster's idea into a full-fledged theory of evidence. A basic construct in Dempster-Shafer theory is basic probability assignment (BPA)
Value m(A) for A ⊆ Ω is called probability mass of A. If m(A) > 0 then A is called a focus. A standard probability function is a belief function whose foci are singletons. From a BPA, one can derive a plausibility function
BPA and plausibility have the same information content since the original m can be recovered from Pl. Shafer [34] proposes to represent statistical evidence by a belief function with nested foci (consonant belief function or CBF ) such that plausibilities on singletons are proportional to the likelihood values. Given a likelihood function lik x , the corresponding CBF is constructed as follows. Suppose lik x partitions Ω into {Ω i } according to its values Ω i = {ω|lik x (ω) = a i } with a 1 > a 2 . . . > a k . Then there are k foci (A i ) and k masses
where a k+1 def = 0. A consequence of nested-focus structure is that plausibility function is union decomposable i.e., for A, B ⊆ Ω
A crucial argument in favor of Shafer's original 3 proposal is that likelihood treatment in CBF is in agreement with the maximum likelihood method (ML) of statistics. In ML, the likelihood assigned to a set of hypotheses is taken to be the maximum of the likelihoods of individual hypothesis in the set. The idea of taking the maximum individual likelihood as the likelihood for a set has been a standard practice since the publication of seminal papers [29] by Neyman and Pearson (1928) . ML is not only intuitively appealing, but it is also backed by various asymptotic optimality properties [25, 26] .
We will use different notation than one in [34] . We want to emphasize the nature of likelihood and avoid belief function connotations. While Shafer is mainly interested in representing and reasoning with evidence, our goal is decision making. Let us define an extended likelihood function Lik y : 2 Ω → [0, 1] as follows.
whereθ is the maximum likelihood estimate of θ.
3 Shafer [35] later renounces his idea on the ground that the set of CBFs is not closed under Dempster's rule of combination, which is the standard rule to combine two distinct pieces of evidence. It implies that representation of compound evidence is not the same as the combination of individual evidences. However, later Walley [39] shows that Dempster's rule is not compatible with the likelihood principle, and therefore is not suitable for combining statistical evidence. He also shows that set of CBFs is closed under an alternative combination rule. With respect to conditioning Dempster's rule and Walley's alternative are identical.
After learning that the true value of parameter is in a subset of the parameter space B ⊆ Ω such that Lik y (B) > 0, one should condition the extended likelihood function by the following equation.
This definition of likelihood conditioning is derived from Dempster's rule of combination applied for a consonant belief function in plausibility form. It also conforms to the likelihood principle as the following example demonstrates. We use the convention Lik y (∅) = 0. Some properties of Lik follow directly from its definitions.
Lemma 1
Example: A r.v. Y is known to have a normal distribution. It is also known that mean µ ∈ {0, 1} and standard deviation σ ∈ {1, 1.5}. Suppose that value y = 1.4 is observed. We want to calculate the extended likelihood function representing uncertainty about unknown parameters. The unknown parameter θ = (µ, σ).
In the first row are It is worth noting that while our derivation of the extended likelihood (CBF) is motivated by statistical considerations, the properties listed in Lemma 1 are also the defining properties of a possibility measure [40, 12] . What distinguishes a possibility function from a CBF is its fuzzy set semantics and, consequently, the notion of ordinal conditioning:
Technically, possibility theory can entertain both notions of conditioning: the ordinal (Eq. 8) and the numerical one specified by Eq. 7. In this sense, extended likelihood is a possibility measure equipped with numerical conditioning. 4 It is not difficult to check (using the previous example) that if Lik was updated using ordinal conditioning then the result would not be consistent with the likelihood principle.
A Decision Theory with Likelihood Uncertainty
Let us formalize the decision problem we will study. We assume a decision situation that includes a set Ω of simple hypotheses (parameter space); a set X of consequences/rewards and an observation y. The uncertainty about hypotheses is expressed by an extended likelihood function π calculated from y. An action a is a mapping Ω → X i.e., the consequence of an action is determined by which hypothesis is true. It should be noted that the states on which rewards are dependent on are not observable. The set of actions is denoted by A. For the sake of clarity, we assume that X is finite and its elements are denoted by
A simple likelihood lottery is an action coupled with a likelihood measure. Each lottery is a mechanism that delivers rewards with associated likelihoods. Formally, a lottery L induced by π and a is a mapping from
) for x ∈ X where a −1 is a setvalued inverse mapping of action a. For the remainder of this paper, we denote a simple lottery by [L(
. .] with convention that those x j for which L(x j ) = 0 are omitted. In this notation, a consequence x ∈ X is identified with a unary lottery [1/x] . Notice that for any lottery
We also consider compound lotteries whose rewards are other lotteries. The set of lotteries is denoted by L.
Axioms
We study preference relation on the set of lotteries L ( ⊆ L 2 ). Indifference ∼ and strict preference relations are derived from .
We postulate that satisfies five axioms similar to those proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern for the classical linear utility theory (in the form presented in [28] ). They are as follows.
is reflexive, transitive and complete.
Since the consequences in X are special lotteries, is also the order on consequences. We can assume that x 1 x 2 . . . x r with x 1 x r . In some cases to make clear we are dealing with the best and the worst consequences, special notations are used for x 1 and x r namely, x ≡ x 1 and x ≡ x r . A lottery that involves only the best x and the worst consequences x as potential outcomes is called a canonical lottery. The set of canonical lotteries is denoted by L c .
(A2) Reduction of compound lotteries.
Let
Among the axioms, A1 and A3 are standard assumptions about a preference relation.
A2 is an implication of the conditioning operation. Suppose that the unknown parameter θ is a vector. We can think, for example, θ = (γ, σ). 
Let us consider a compound lottery
obtains, the holder is rewarded with consequence x j .
Let us consider another one-stage lottery L that delivers x j in case tuple
The set of tuples for which x j is delivered is
Since L and L have the property that no matter what is the true value of θ, the consequences they deliver are always the same, we require L ∼ L which is axiom A2. Figure 1 shows an example where k = 2 and r = 2,
Axiom A4 requires that for any consequence x ∈ X there is a canonical lottery c = [λ 1 /x, λ 2 /x] such that x ∼ c. For clarity, let us assume that x = 1, x = 0 (the argument remains valid for any real values of x and x as long as x > x). For any x ∈ [0, 1], we need to find a canonical lottery c equivalent to x. We will describe a likelihood gamble for this purpose.
There are three parties in this game: the Arbiter, the House and the Player. The goal of the game is to gauge binary utility function for the Player. The game plays as follows. The Arbiter preselects a single parameter probability distribution f θ . She also predetermines 2 values {θ 1 , θ 2 } that she will use for the unknown parameter. Probability distribution f θ as well as 
L ¨¨¨¨¨B r r r r r r j The Arbiter secretly picks a value θ in {θ 1 , θ 2 } then generates a value y from f θ . The mechanism used by the Arbiter to pick the value θ is unknown to both the Player and the House. Both the Player and the House are told about the data y. The House offers a gamble that pays x to the Player if the value actually used by the Arbiter to generate the observation is θ 1 and x if it is θ 2 . What is the highest price the Player would be willing to pay for this gamble? If the answer is x, then for the Player,
where
One can repeat this gamble any number of times to get a table of correspondence between x i and [Lik y i (θ 1 )/x, Lik y i (θ 2 )/x]. What we assume in A4 is that we can make the table rich enough so that for any x ∈ X we can look up the table for an equivalent [Lik
Comparing the likelihood gamble with a probabilistic gamble 6 used in practice to extract decision maker's (unary) utility, we see a number of important differences. First, instead of r.v. with a known distribution, e.g., tossing a fair coin or rolling a dice, a partially specified probability model is used. Second, the rewards for the Player in the likelihood gamble are dependent, not on an observation (y) but on the unobservable true value of the parameter (θ). In this sense, a likelihood gamble is a simple hypothesis testing problem because the Player needs to decide which of two hypotheses θ = θ 1 or θ = θ 2 is true. The relationship is made clear in Figure 5 .
What kind of betting behavior should be expected from a rational decision maker? Certain patterns should be excluded as irrational. In the example of a likelihood gamble that uses a normal distribution with known s.d. σ = 1 and pays $1 if mean is −1 and 0 if it is 1, paying $0.20 for the gamble if y = −3 and paying $0.70 if y = 1 would be irrational. Intuitively, observation y = −3 lends more support to hypothesis θ = −1 than observation y = 1. Let us formalize this intuition. We impose a mild constraint in the form of monotonicity axiom (A5). Basically, we require that the price for lottery [λ/1, µ/0] is greater or equal to the price for [λ /1, µ /0] if the likelihood of getting 1 in the former is higher than that of the latter (λ ≥ λ ) and likelihood of getting 0 in the former is less than that of the latter (µ ≤ µ ).
We justify A5 on the basis of first order stochastic dominance (FSD). Not being strictly Bayesian, we won't assume to know the prior probability of P (θ = θ 1 ), but we will assume that such a prior exists. This situation can be modeled by viewing the prior of θ = θ 1 as a r.v. ρ taking value in the unit interval. The distribution of ρ is unknown to us. We calculate the posterior of θ = θ 1 given y and ρ.
The expected payoff of the likelihood gamble
With x−x > 0, V y (ρ) is a strictly increasing function of P ρ (θ = θ 1 |y). When x = 1 and x = 0, Eq. 15 is further simplified to V y (ρ) = P ρ (θ = θ 1 |y). Being a function of ρ, V y (ρ) is a r.v. The concept of stochastic dominance (SD) has been used extensively in economics, finance, statistics [27] . Suppose X and Y are two distinct r.v. with the cumulative distributions F and G respectively. We say that X stochastically dominates (to the first degree) Y (written as
Since X and Y are distinct, strict inequality must hold for at least one value x. FSD is important because of the following equivalence: X stochastically dominates (first order) Y iff the expected utility of X is greater than or equal to the expected utility of Y for all non-decreasing utility functions i.e., XD 1 
where U the class of non-decreasing utility functions and E(.) is the expectation operator.
In the immediately following discussion, we will assume x = 1 and x = 0 for the sake of clarity without any loss on generality.
Lemma 2 For
Because max( 
Theorem 1 Suppose ρ is a r.v. taking values in the unit interval. Then
The order on canonical lotteries stipulated by axiom A5 is the order by first degree stochastic dominance of their expected payoffs if the prior is r.v. In Figure 2 , the lower curve is the graph for V 0.60 (ρ) (at Y = .6, the corresponding lottery is [.3011/1, 1/0]) and the upper curve is the graph for V 0.26 (ρ) ([.5945/1, 1/0]). This completes our justification for the five axioms. 
Binary Utility
We will now proceed to study the preference relation satisfying the axioms.
The following lemma shows that the set of lotteries divided by the indifference relation (L/ ∼) is isomorphic to the set of canonical lotteries (L c ).
Lemma 3 If the preference relation on the set of lotteries L satisfies axioms A1 though A5, then for each lottery there exists one and only one canonical lottery indifferent to it.
Proof: We prove the existence of indifferent canonical lottery by induction on the depth of lottery trees. For a constant lottery (of depth 0), because of A4, each consequence x i is indifferent to a canonical lottery s i . Let assume
A lottery of depth 1 is a simple lottery. If it is a canonical lottery, by reflexivity, a canonical lottery is indifferent to itself. For a simple lottery
Suppose for any lottery of depth not greater than n, there is a canonical lottery indifferent to it. For a lottery L of depth n + 1. This lottery is a compound lottery whose consequences are lotteries of depth not greater than n. Because of induction hypothesis, each consequence of L is indifferent to a canonical lottery. By substitutability, L is indifferent to a compound lottery of depth 2 which, in turn, is indifferent to a canonical lottery by induction hypothesis. By transitivity, L is indifferent to some canonical lottery.
Finally
The significance of Lemma 3 is that it reduces a comparison of lotteries to one of canonical lotteries that have a simple structure and a straightforward interpretation. We want to represent by a utility function so that a comparison of lotteries can be done through the calculation of their utilities. Our main idea here is to use as a utility scale a set that is isomorphic to the set of canonical lotteries. Let us define
In words, U is the set of pair of numbers in the unit interval such that one of them is 1. A linear order -on U (to distinguish from the order ≥ on scalars) is defined as
Strict preference ( ) and indifference (=) derivatives are also used. The special structure of U allows a simplification of order definition given in Eq. 19. The proof of the following lemma is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Lemma 4 For
We refer to U equipped with order -as the binary utility scale. Roughly, we can interpret two components in a utility value as indices of goodness (first) and badness (second). One binary utility value is better than another if the goodness index of the former is higher than that of the latter or the badness index of the former is smaller than badness index of the latter. Note that this binary utility is a special case of the lexicographic utility [15] . Lemma 4 shows that two indices have symmetrical roles, no one has precedence over the other. One index is used as tie breaking in case equality holds for the other index.
To operate on binary utilities, we extend 7 product and max operations to work with pairs as follows. For scalar α, β, π and γ
We have some properties of the extended max operation. The proof is straightforward and is therefore omitted.
Representation Theorem
A utility function is a mapping from the set of lotteries into the utility scale U : L → U. We say that a preference relation
For a function f defined on set X, we let f (X) denote {f (x)|x ∈ X}. We have the following theorem. 
Therefore, on one hand
Thus, we show QU(L) = max 1≤i≤r {π i .QU(x i )}. By induction on lottery's depth, we can prove this property for any lottery. (⇐) Suppose q is represented by QU that satisfies Eq. 25 and 1, 0 ,
We show that q satisfies axioms A1 through A5. A1 is satisfied because relation -defined on U by Eq. 19 is reflexive, complete and transitive. Let 
Denote by x, x the elements of X such that QU(x) = 1, 0 and QU(x) = 0, 1 . By Eq. 19 and definition of q , we have x q x and x q x for all x ∈ X. For any canonical lottery [λ/x, µ/x] where max{λ, µ} = 1, by Eq. 25 we
Thus, by Eq. 19 we conclude that A5 is satisfied.
Finally, for x ∈ X, let assume QU(x) = λ, µ .
By above argument, we have QU(x) = QU([λ/x, µ/x]). By definition of q we infer
Thus, A4 is satisfied.
While proposing axioms A1 through A5, we argue the rationale for each axiom separately, but not the consistency of the axiom system as a whole. The fact that the axiom system is represented by a well defined utility function proves that it is free from inconsistency. In particular, when L is a simple lottery, Eq. 25 can be rewritten as
The form of QU in (27) resembles the vNM expected utility expression. The expected utility of a probabilistic lottery p on X is defined as U (p)
Maximization in (27) plays the same role as its counterpart -additionin the vNM expected utility. This similarity leads us to refer to QU also as expected qualitative utility function. Figure 4 illustrates QU calculation for a two-stage lottery. Assuming QU(x 1 ) = 1, 0 , QU(x 2 ) = 1, .8 and QU(x 3 ) = 0, 1 , a roll-back calculation shows that
Although qualitative and vNM utilities share fundamental structure, it is important to emphasize that the qualitative utility is not just a simple translation of vNM utility in a new language. Not all properties of vNM utility hold for the qualitative version. Notably, the qualitative utility only satisfies weaker versions of independence and Archimedian properties [24] . 
Proof: Let us assume QU(L
will satisfy the former inequality. Otherwise λ 1 = λ 2 , we have then µ 1 < µ 2 . We choose λ = 1 and µ strictly positive and small enough so that µ.
Note that property (a) does not hold for strict preference. That is, in general, we don
Related Work
In the AI literature, a number of decision models that do not assume probability have been studied [36, 7, 23] . Brafman and Tennenholtz [7] characterize qualitative decision rules: maximin, minimax regret and competitive ratios and maximax. They show that these different decision criteria are equivalent in terms of representation power. These purely qualitative rules ignore the uncertainty relevant to choice problem. Smets [36] proposes a two-level decision model for Dempster-Shafer belief functions. At the credal level, an agent uses belief functions to represent and reason with uncertainty. When she needs to make decision she will translate a belief function into probability using pignistic transformation. Basically, this transformation allocates the probability mass that assigned to a focus equally to each of its element. Smets' model is not able to handle ambiguity attitudes. For example, when applied for Ellsberg's paradox [14] , this model produces an unintuitive solution. Halpern [23] studies a very general uncertainty measure called the plausibility measure. To make decisions, he defines an operation that maps the product of consequence domain and plausibility domain into a valuation domain. The order on valuation domain is defined by a decision rule. In [19] , we also study a decision making model for Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs. This uncertainty measure is closely related to extended likelihood, and can be interpreted as order-of-magnitude approximation of probabilities or as degrees of plain beliefs.
More relevant to this work is an approach to decision making with possibility theory proposed by Dubois et al [10] . As noted earlier, a possibility function satisfies equations (5, 6) that define an extended likelihood function. The main difference is about the conditioning operation. Dubois et al use the ordinal conditioning defined by Eq. 8. The likelihood conditioning (or the numerical conditioning) is defined in Eq. 7. They distinguish two decision criteria: pessimistic and optimistic. For each decision criterion, there is an axiom system and a qualitative utility functional representing preference relation that satisfies the axioms. A detailed comparative analysis between our approach vs the approach argued by Dubois et al is presented in [21] . We show that our approach, modified for ordinal conditioning, generalizes and unifies pessimistic and optimistic decision criteria.
In our framework, a decision maker's attitude toward ambiguity shows itself in her basic utility assignment for consequences in X. Recall that the indifference between a consequence and a (binary) utility value is determined through a likelihood gamble. We will see that her betting behavior encodes an interesting information, namely, her attitude toward ambiguity.
Suppose that our decision maker equates payoff x with canonical lottery [λ/1, µ/0]. From the Bayesian decision theory point of view, this indifference means that the expected payoff V y (ρ) (with respect to prior ρ) of the likelihood gamble is equal to x. Substitute x for V y (ρ) and λ, µ for Lik y (θ 1 ), Lik y (1) into Eq. 13 and solve for ρ we find
We call ρ calculated by Eq. 28 an implicit prior 8 for the obvious reason. 8 It is necessary to note that the implicit prior value is unique for a single bet. A betting behavior that implies different implicit priors for different likelihood gambles can still be consistent with A5. For more details on the range of permissible priors, readers are referred to [18] . Recall that in the context of a likelihood gamble, ρ is the probability, in Player's judgment, that the Arbiter selects θ 1 (on which x is contracted) as the parameter value to generate the given observation. Thus inequality ρ < 0.5 can be interpreted as that the Player a priori deems the bad outcome is more likely than the good one. English language has a specific name for the mental attitude that tends to emphasize adverse aspects -pessimism. Similarly, the opposite ρ > 0.5 can be argued as a manifestation of optimism. This definition of pessimism (optimism) is very different than the notion of pessimism (optimism) 9 put forward by Dubois et al. [10] where it is a property of an axiom system attributed to a decision maker. In this paper, however, pessimism (optimism) is a property attributed to a basic utility assignment by a decision maker.
Another sensible terminology can be used for pessimism and optimism. A betting behavior is said to exhibit ambiguity averse (ρ < 0.5), ambiguity neutral (ρ = 0.5) or ambiguity seeking (ρ > 0.5) attitudes. It is useful to analyze similarity as well as distinction between the notion of ambiguity attitude and the established notion of risk attitude. The latter is a property of a utility function (money-to-utility conversion). Risk averse, risk neutral and risk seeking attitudes correspond to concavity, linearity and convexity of utility functions. In this paper, we do not explicitly consider the risk attitude issue. However, risk attitude could be easily incorporated in our framework by assuming that elements of X in utility unit i.e., x = u(d) where d has dollar unit and u is a dollar-to-utility function. Figure 5 illustrates the roles of risk and ambiguity attitudes in the transformation from monetary unit to binary utility via unary utility.
In Economics and Statistics literature, a prominent axiomatic decision theory without (additive) probability has been studied by Schmeidler [32] and extended by Gilboa [22] and Sarin and Wakker [31] . Schmeidler considers a preference relation on acts (functions from Ω to X) and assumes it satisfies following axioms. Suppose f, g, h are acts. S1 Weak order. f g or g f ; If f g and g h then f h. Two
satisfies the axioms S1 − S5 iff there is a unique capacity measure v on 2 Ω and
utility of act f with respect to capacity v -is defined as follows. For simplicity, we assume that X is a set of reals, interpreted as utilities, and is ordered
The major difference from von Neumann-Morgenstern's approach is in axiom S2 that stipulates that independence is applicable for co-monotonic acts only. Since likelihood functions satisfy the requirements for a capacity function, it makes sense to compare our approach with Schmeidler's. Notice also that both approaches have representation theorems. Therefore, the discussion could be either in terms of the axioms or in terms of the utility functions.
First, CEU is a real-valued function while QU is not. In our setting, consequences are bounded (by x and x). Schmeidler's setting has no such restriction. It is easy to show that preference relation QU , represented by QU, satisfies S1, S4 and S5 but not S2 and S3.
Let us examine the preference relation CEU , represented by CEU, in relation to our axioms A1 − A5. Clearly, since A1 is the same as S1, CEU satisfies A1.
Strictly speaking, likelihood functions, which satisfy requirements for a capacity measure, are not a special case of capacity function. The most important difference is that while conditioning is well defined for likelihood function, it is not clear if and how such an operation could be defined for capacity functions. Suppose (for the sake of an argument) that such an operation exist. Then reduction of compound lotteries axiom A2 is a reasonable requirement. However, it is unlikely that would be the case. Here is the evidence. In Schmeidler's approach, each act is a two-stage lottery. The first stage is a horse lottery whose uncertainty is described by a capacity function. The rewards of a horse lottery are roulette lotteries. The uncertainty pertaining to the roulette lotteries is described by a probability function. In [31] , Sarin and Wakker consider one-stage setting where the event algebra for lotteries contains a sub-algebra of "unambiguous" events for which uncertainty is probability. They are able to retain Choquet expected utility representation. Sarin and Wakker show [31] that their approach and Schmeidler's one are irreconcilable. This result implies that preference relation represented by CEU does not satisfy property like A2.
CEU also violates qualitative monotonicity axiom (A5). Let us calculate CEU for canonical acts with respect to likelihood function π assuming for simplicity x = 1 and x = −1. For a canonical act a that delivers the best consequence (x) if A occurs and the worst consequence (x) otherwise (A occurs). This means A a 0 = A and A a 1 = Ω.
First we observe that CEU for a canonical act does not depend on the capacity of event that leads to worst consequence. v(A) = 1 − v(A) because a capacity measure is non-additive. In the case of likelihood function π, equality π(A) = 1 does not imply any information about the value of π(A). CEU equalizes canonical acts which have the same capacity on the best consequence. A5 requires a comparison of capacities of getting worst consequence when the capacities of getting the best consequence are equal. Schmeidler's CEU representation is the result of considering (i) separation of "utility" from "probability" and (ii) "functional representations which are the sum of products of two numbers; one number has a "probability" interpretation and the other has a "utility" interpretation" ( [32] p.584). The resulting capacity function is implicit and its updating operation is not explicitly considered. In contrast, our approach starts with an uncertainty calculus with its properly defined updating rules and then develops a decision theory where utility is derived from "probability".
This observation seems to suggest that CEU is not appropriate for existing (non-probabilistic) uncertainty calculi such as Dempster-Shafer belief functions [34] , fuzzy possibility [40] and plausibility measures [23] that have well-defined updating rules.
The lack of an updating rule for capacity subjects CEU to the following criticism. Suppose v is a capacity measure, one can define its dual by v (A)
It is not difficult to see that v is also a capacity measure. It is arguable that v and v contain the same information because v is recoverable from v . Despite visible symmetry between v and v , rankings of acts by CEU v and by CEU v are different. In this sense, CEU is not sensitive to information.
Such criticism is void for uncertainty calculi with well defined updating rules. The dual of a probability measure is itself. The dual of a possibility measure is a necessity measure but their updating rules are different. The same is also true for the dual pair of belief (Bel) and plausibility (Pl) functions in Dempster-Shafer theory. Thus, from a decision making point of view, the measures are not symmetric despite being duals of each other.
Likelihood Solution to Statistical Inference

Decision-theoretic approach to statistical inference
We will review the decision-theoretic approach to statistical inference. We assume as given the set of alternative actions denoted by A, and the sample space of Y by Y. A loss V (a, θ) measures the loss that arises if we take action a and the true value of the parameter is θ 10 .A decision rule is a mapping δ : Y → A, that is for an observation y the rule recommends an action δ(y). The risk function of a decision rule δ at parameter value θ is defined as
The risk function measures the average loss by adopting the rule δ in case θ is the true value. The further use of risk functions depends on how much information we assume is available. For each point in the parameter space, there is a value of the risk function. In case no a priori information about parameter exists, Wald [38] advocated the use of minimax rule which minimizes the worst risk that could be attained by a rule.
where ∆ is the set of decision rules. δ * is called the minimax solution.
If we assume, as the Bayesian school does, the existence of a prior distribution for the parameter, then the risk could be averaged out to one number called Bayes risk
where ρ is prior distribution for θ. Then the optimal rule is one that minimizes the Bayes risk which is called the Bayes solution.
Wald [38] pointed out there exists a prior distribution ρ * called "the least favorable" for which the Bayes solution is the minimax solution. The term "Bayes" is justified by the fact that the solution is also obtained via a more intuitive route using Bayes theorem and the principle of minimizing expected loss. Given prior probability distribution ρ on Ω, for each data y ∈ Y a posterior probability on Ω is obtained via Bayes theorem
Denote by a p (y) the action that minimizes the expected loss given data y
Let us define a rule δ * P (y) → a p (y) i.e., for each data y, rule δ * P delivers the action that minimizes the expected loss.
Lemma 6 δ *
P is a Bayes solution i.e., r(δ * P ) = r(δ * Bayes,ρ )
Proof: We need to show that the Bayes risk for δ * P is minimal i.e.,
Substitute Eq. 29 into Eq. 31, we have
It would be enough to show that ∀y ∈ Y,
The last inequality is an implication of Eqs. 33 and 34.
Likelihood solution
Without knowing prior ρ, we propose the following solution based on the logic that leads to δ * P . For each y ∈ Y, there is an associated extended likelihood function Lik y . An action together with a likelihood function induce a likelihood lottery. For an action a and an observation y, denote by L a (y) the lottery that is generated. Likelihood lotteries are compared by QU. The selected action given observation y is
where sup 11 is the operation taking maximum element according to the binary order -. We define a decision rule δ * Lik (y) → a Lik (y) which assigns for each point in the sample space an action that maximizes the (qualitative) utility. We call such decision rule a likelihood solution.
There are two dimensions in which solutions δ * minimax , δ * Bayes and δ * Lik can be compared. The first one concerns information. How much information is assumed to be available to the decision maker and how it is utilized. In order to apply the Bayes solution, we must know the prior distribution of the unknown parameter. As mentioned earlier, in many situations, such an assumption is not realistic. However, if the prior is known, the posterior probability could be calculated, and the Bayes solution makes full use of this extra-experiment information as well as the information provided by experimental results (likelihood). In Wald's proposal, the risk function has no special role for the actually observed data, thus, it ignores information about the parameter obtainable from the data. One can argue that the minimax rule reflects a cautious attitude. But it is, in our opinion, too cautious. The likelihood solution does not assume knowing the prior, but it does make use of likelihood information provided by data in identifying the best action. The concept of stochastic dominance provides another dimension for comparing the three solutions. Apart from FSD, stochastic dominance of second and higher degree are defined. For simplicity, following [6] , assume r.v. are non-negative, i.e., cumulative distribution functions satisfy F (0) = 0. For cumulative distribution function F , define for any natural n (38) with notation F 1 = F. Suppose X, Y are two r.v. (we use the same symbols for their cumulative distribution function), we say X is preferred to Y according to n-degree stochastic dominance (write XnSDY ) if X n (z) ≤ Y n (z) for z ≥ 0. It is well known that (i) n-degree dominance implies all higher degree dominance and (ii) higher the degree, the greater relative importance is assigned to small value of r.v. Borch [6] shows that Wald's minimax rule is equivalent to stochastic dominance of infinite degree. The order satisfying vNM axioms can be viewed as "zero degree" stochastic dominance because it boils down to the comparison of numbers -expected utility values -that are, of course, singular r.v. Thus, we can arrange Bayes, likelihood and minimax solutions in an increasing order according to their SD degrees.
As mentioned in the introduction, statistical inference, via its manifestation as probabilistic model selection, should be of interest for researchers in AI, machine learning, pattern recognition and data mining. However, most works in these areas continue to select a model using simple criteria such as maximum likelihood (ML) or maximum a posteriori probability (MAP). From a decision theoretic point of view, the use of these criteria is equivalent to assuming equal utilities (costs) for all models under consideration. Clearly, it is a gross simplification. For example, between two models of approximately the same likelihoods, most researchers would go for a simpler one and justify this choice by invoking Occam's razor principle (principle of parsimony). In the statistics literature, models are selected by using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [1] or Schwarz's criterion (also known as Bayesian Information Criterion or BIC) [33] . The idea underlying both AIC and BIC is to penalize model's likelihood by an amount depending on its number of parameters. Poland and Shachter [30] suggest the "effectiveness ratio" criterion where the penalty has an explicit computational interpretation. Clearly, the concern on complexity can be viewed as a cost associated with a model. In broader terms, an implication that can be drawn from these works is that different models are associated with different costs. And therefore, these costs must be taken into account in a model selection process.
An Illustrative Example
The following example is adapted from [3] . The manufacturer of small travel clocks which are sold through a chain of department stores agrees to service any clock once only if it fails to operate satisfactorily in the first year of purchase. For any clock, a decision must be made on whether to merely clean it or replace the works, i.e., the set of actions A = {a 1 , a 2 } where a 1 denotes "clean the clock then replace the work if needed", and a 2 denotes "immediately replace the works".
Let us assume that there are only two possible faults i.e., Ω = {θ 1 , θ 2 } where θ 1 means there is the need for cleaning and θ 2 means the clock has been physically damaged and the works need replacement. Utility and loss functions are given in the following table. The relationship between utility (u) and loss (V ) is through equation
The loss table is roughly estimated from the fact that cleaning a clock costs $0.20 and replacing the works costs $0.50. If the policy is to replace the works for every clock needing service then the cost is $0.50 no matter which problem is present. If the policy is to clean a clock first, if the state is θ 1 then the service costs $0.20, however in the case of physical damage then cleaning alone obviously does not fix the problem and the manufacturer ends up replacing the works also. Thus the total cost is $0.70. The manufacturer can ask the customer to provide a symptom of malfunction when a clock is sent to the service center. The symptom can be viewed as observation. Assume the sample space Y = {y 1 , y 2 , y 3 } where y 1 means "the clock has stopped operating", y 2 -"the clock is erratic in timekeeping and y 3 -"clock can only run for a limited period". Such information gives some indication about θ that is expressed in terms of likelihood
For each point in the sample space, you can either choose a 1 or a 2 , so there are 8 possible decision rules in total. Each decision rule specifies an action given an observation. 1 a 1 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 2 a 2 a 2  y 2 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 2 a 1 a 1 a 2 a 2  y 3 a 1 a 2 a 1 a 2 a 1 a 2 a 1 8 . It is because, as we noted, minimax solution ignores the uncertainty generated by an observation while likelihood solution does not. In this sense, likelihood solution is more information efficient.
If the prior probability p(θ 1 ) = .7, then the Bayes solution is δ 5 the same as the likelihood solution. If prior probability is available, one can argue that Bayes solution is the optimal one. However, the "optimality" of the Bayes solution does not come without cost. The requirement of prior probability can be satisfied either at some monetary cost (doing research, or buying from those who have). Alternatively, the decision maker can just assume in an ad hoc manner some prior distribution. This however would compromise the claimed optimality of a Bayes solution. One can extend the concept of Bayes solution by including a sensitivity analysis. This certainly helps decision maker by providing a frame of reference. But sensitivity analysis itself does not constitute any basis for knowing the prior probability.
One should be careful not to draw too much from the coincidence of the likelihood solution (δ 5 ) and the Bayes solution that corresponds to the largest prior interval. It is a result of several factors some of those are ad hoc (e.g., unary-binary utility conversion). However, as we pointed out, axioms A1 to A5 on which likelihood solution is based, are structurally similar to those used by Luce and Raiffa [28] to justify the expected utility maximization principle which ultimately is the basis for Bayes solutions. Thus, at the foundational level, optimality of likelihood solution could be justified in the same way as the optimality for Bayes solution although the two optimality concepts are obviously different. It can be argued that the question of which optimality has precedence over the other depends on how much information is available.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a decision theory that utilizes likelihood information without assuming the existence of prior probability. We extend likelihood function as the uncertainty measure pertaining to the statistical inference problem. The extension, conforming to the practice of maximum likelihood methods, defines the likelihood for a set of parameter values to be the maximum likelihood over elements of the set.
Our approach is axiomatic. The axioms considered are similar in spirit to those used by von Neumann-Morgenstern for the linear utility theory, but strictly different in several important aspects. We describe a betting behavior based on likelihood rather than on probability. This behavior satisfies the stochastic dominance principle. We prove a representation theorem for preference relation over likelihood lotteries using the newly developed concept of binary utility.
Applied to the statistical inference problem, our theory suggests a new solution that picks an action by maximizing expected qualitative utility. This solution is sandwiched between Wald's minimax solution and the Bayes solution in terms of information use/demand. It makes use of uncertainty information that is ignored by the minimax solution but does not require a prior probability as the Bayes solution does.
We are investigating potential applications of the results of this work for the problem of probabilistic model selection.
